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Abstract—Bioinformatics has developed some very sophisti-
cated algorithms used for searching within the large amounts
of data produced by sequencing projects. Introduced here is a
method that leverages these algorithms for processing computer
network data trafﬁc to ﬁnd and classify information in a way
that avoids many of the operations that are required of more
traditional methods of processing network data packets. It can
be used to avoid processing the data through a protocol stack in
order to extract the content to make it ready for searching as
well as being able to a access the advanced search capabilities
developed for biological data. Raw data (for example whole
Ethernet packets or strings/ motifs) can be directly searched for
within a database of structure signatures to indicate packets of
interest via structures within the query packet. The structures
referred to here are the “patterns of patterns” within the data.
This paper describes the results obtained by creating a searchable
database based on bioinformatics techniques and searching it
using sample data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Searching for one or more items in a collection of items
is a very common task in computing. For data traveling
over a computer network, this can be particularly difﬁcult.
The method of searching using the approach pioneered for
bioinformatics to process biological data is applicable to other
forms of data having similar structure - in particular applying
it to data traveling over a computer network opens up a
number of new ways to ﬁnd information hidden in large data
ﬂows. This paper documents the initial idea and feasability of
using algorithms developed to target biological information on
computer network data ﬂows.
Searching the content of packetized network data (such as
that carried over TCP/IP [1] networks) for keywords and terms
is usually undertaken via extracting the content using the ap-
propriate protocols for the data stream involved, the content of
which is then searched for items of interest. Meta information
about the protocols present is either available from the protocol
stack processing the data stream, or is added via a database
embedded in the application being used (for example, the
WireShark [2] network protocol dissector/analyzer software).
Most common search techniques use simple text matching or
regular expression based search mechanisms, but these are
less effective at the lower levels of the protocol stack due
to fragmentation and interleaving of other data between parts
of the message to be scrutinized, often in the middle of a
word or phrase. It is the task of a protocol stack like that used
for much of the worlds data communications (TCP/IP [1]) to
reassemble the original data into the same format/package that
was originally sent so search operations can be applied to it.
What we are proposing here is to avoid the computational
load and resource usage of search operations at higher levels
of the protocol stack by storing signatures or ﬁngerprints
representing known data and interesting terms that may be
carried as part of a packet payload in a separate database. Any
new packet of data from a networks can be searched within
the database and the resulting areas of congruence (or motifs
in common) ranked in order of signiﬁcance giving generating
meta data about the packet independent of the protocol stack.
In this way particular terms and phrases can be highlighted
without having to search for each one as a separate process.
An added beneﬁt of the algorithms being proposed is that they
have some ability to deal with data that is interleaved with
unrelated data or split across boundaries.
This differs from the usual process of “deep packet in-
spection” [3] which usually entails processing the packet data
through a large part of the protocol stack to retrieve the (sub)
data stream to target. An example of deep packet inspection
is to search incoming web (using the HTTP protocol) query
results for banned terms or information leakage. The program
tasked with analyzing the content usually has to extract and
format the HTTP sessions in order to scan the text.
For fast efﬁcient search operations, some very sophisticated
algorithms and programming techniques have been developed
for bioinformatics tasks. Particularly important for the method
being described here are both the very fast database lookups
possible, and the statistics made available which enable sense
to be made of the very complex relationships involved. There
are a number of differences in the strategy being proposed
here to what normally occurs in deep packet inspection. The
basic process is:
1) For each whole packet of data from the network
2) Search the signature database using the whole packet
3) Process the possibly numerous motifs-in-common be-
tween the search packet and database entries using valid
statistical methods
4) Select the appropriate “hit” on the database
5) Take the appropriate action
Many different types of database systems are available
which are suitable for solving all sorts of problems. These
range from simple key/value pair constructs, through to
RDMS (Relational Database Management Systems) and OO
databases (Object Oriented databases). The designers of the
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978-1-4244-8129-3/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE 526large databases that support bioinformatics use a number of
different database types (National Center for Biotechnology
Information - NCBI [4]) depending on need. The database
format that is of interest here is used to both supply datasets
to external researchers and as a means to efﬁciently, and
speedily search the large datasets used in bioinformatics for
statistically validated matches using poorly deﬁned search
terms. “Poorly deﬁned” in this context has a meaning of data
that is “nearby” as deﬁned by an appropriate metric or distance
ﬁgure. Databases and related indexes for DNA data are created
using a software program known as “formatdb” [5] from the
NCBI [4]. The databases created are in the form of indexed
signatures that can be searched using algorithms such as
BLAST [6] and Smith and Waterman [7] giving results ranked
on the statistical importance of the matches. The important
point to note is not the use of an indexed ﬂat ﬁle database that
is used for storage, but the search mechanism and statistical
support for the results. BLAST [6] and the competing Smith
and Waterman [7] algorithm (used by the fasta [8] series
of programs) algorithms commonly used to search genomic
data use methods that are effectively searching for structures
contained within the data query against structures contained
within the data signatures stored in the database. The method
used by the BLAST [6] algorithm (via the software utility of
the same name) uses a sophisticated word based comparison
method to identify areas of congruence between the input
vector and each record in the database. It builds up a set of
motif’s in the query vector that correspond to motifs within
vectors in the database. It then calculates the quality score for
each motif returning those above a threshold in the form of
an report ordered by signiﬁcance (based on each score).
It is possible to pre-format network data packets (such as
TCP/IP data packets [1]) for use with formatdb [5] to produce
a very fast, high performance database of packet types that
allows fast lookup and classiﬁcation of data packets with
relevant meta-data concerning statistics relating to false alarm
rate and identity. This allows not only a lookup of “what is
the closest match”, but “what else is a near match” along
with statistically based rankings. While protocol information
is important, it is the payload (packet content) that is of most
interest in the use of this type of search. While it is quite
practical (and IBM has succeeded in doing this for email
[9]) to use similar algorithms being discussed here to search
content recovered from a stream of network trafﬁc, there is
more information available before the low level information is
stripped via the normal operation of network protocol stacks.
Bioinformatics algorithms have been applied to parts of the
computer security equation as demonstrated by Coull et. al. in
2003 [10] but not in the way being explored here at this level
of the protocol stack.
II. STATISTICS
To ﬁnd both exact and near matches for a query in the
database, a way is needed to accurately rank the results taking
into account the length of the query and the length of the
matching parts of the query to one or more database entries.
A method of statistically detecting false hits is also desired.
A false hit is one that is returned by a query and ranked as
signiﬁcant when it is not. As databases get larger it becomes
more likely that they will contain random matches to a motif
in a query. The chance of this occurring can be calculated
statistically and the resulting value is known as a “False Alarm
Rate” where it can be deﬁned for the use to which it is
put here as “ The chance of retrieving a false value from
the database for a motif of this length in a database of this
size.” Unfortunately, a false alarm rate is an analog value, not
yes/no categorization so it is up to the user to set a threshold
value - the closer to zero the better. The NCBI Handbook [4]
suggests an upper limit of the false alarm rate for biological
comparisons to be considered signiﬁcant is approximately -
0.01.
In bioinformatics, two types of statistics are used to calcu-
late the rankings - a “score” and an “E-value”. The score is
used to rank the hits in the database according to their size
and quality of the match while E-values are used to calculate
the possibility that a result is false - the calculated False
Alarm Rate based on the speciﬁc parameters for this query. A
signiﬁcant match in the database is one that is characterized
as having a high score, and a low E-value (a good match with
an expectation that it is due to a real data similarity rather
than just coincidence.) Note that these values are analog in
nature and do not represent yes/no decisions - they are usually
managed using thresholds to remove obviously poor/wrong
results (those with a high false alarm rate or very low score.)
with the remainder being presented for human examination.
A. Score
The score is a value that is used to compare and rank the
comparisons made by algorithms such as BLAST and FASTA.
It is a composite metric that tries to provide a single ﬁgure
that takes into account the similarity and size of individual
matches. For BLAST, NCBI [4] gives the description: “The
value S’ is derived from the raw alignment score S in which
the statistical properties of the scoring system used have been
taken into account. By normalizing a raw score using the
formula:
S′ =
S   lnK
ln2
a bit score S’ is attained, which has a standard set of units,
and where K and lambda are the statistical parameters of the
scoring system. Because bit scores have been normalized with
respect to the scoring system, they can be used to compare
alignment scores from different searches.” [4].
The larger the score, the better the match in the quality of
the per character match over the length of the match. The
score is calculated after alignment has occurred - alignment
being the process of aligning like motifs within both the
query sequence and each sequence stored within the database.
This may require gaps to be inserted in one or other of
the sequences in order to move the motif’s into a proper
relationship - areas of high similarity being directly compared
with other highly similar areas. The score is then calculated
527as a distance metric using the above formula which calculates
a higher value where there are areas with a high similarity
between the query and database entry being compared. The
formula takes into account both the length of the matching
areas and the quality of the match enabling retrieval of the
best and most relevant matches in the database along with
a false alarm rate statistic. This allows likely bad results to
be discarded and the remainder ranked from closest to most
distant by similarity. The size of the query vector and the
database entries does not matter - its the size of the motifs
shared between the query and the relevant database entry that
is important.
B. E-Value
E-Values (or Expectation-Values) are a useful method for
calculating the signiﬁcance of results returned from database
searches. The E-value as used by BLAST [6] and other
bioinformatics programs is usually quoted as ”a parameter that
describes the number of hits one can expect to see by chance
when searching a database of a particular size.” [4] BLAST
uses the following formula to calculate the E-Value for two
sequences of length m and n with a normalised score of S’:
E = mn2−S
′
A value of zero, or very close to zero is desired which means
that there is only an extremely small chance the result is due
to the coincidence that a matching piece of data is present in
the database. E-Values decrease exponentially with the score
that is assigned to a match between two sequences. As the E-
Values increase, the ”false alarm rate” increases until results
can be considered worthless. The actual value that is used
to determine signiﬁcance vs insigniﬁcance as a cut-off varies
depending on the needs of researchers - in bioinformatics,
using too stringent value can eliminate possibly relevant results
(those that are more distantly related), while a too loose value
will cause a researcher to waste time analyzing results that
have no relevance.
III. METHOD
The results being discussed here were obtained using a
manually constructed database consisting of anonymously gen-
erated network data. The source data was assembled by using
an isolated island data network set up to speciﬁcally collect
network data using tools such as WireShark [2] with volunteer
users sending email, VoIP calls and various other network
actions. Users are anonymous in that they are speciﬁcally
created accounts on generically set up desktop computers and
servers to send innocuous messages knowing that the contents
must contain no personal or identiﬁable information about
real people and therefore ensuring that no personnel/private
data is collected. For example, the testers use random user
names and content for emails sent over the network where
the speciﬁcation requires (for example) “10 emails to each of
4 recipients from an administration account on host 2”. The
collected data was stored in the pcap [11] format for post
processing.
The data was then translated into a form suitable for
processing by bioinformatics programs. In a project such as
this which is using highly complex algorithms implemented in
complex software by large institutions/teams of programmers,
it is not practical for individual researchers to rewrite such
software for specialized tasks. In this case the solution was
to process the pcap [11] formatted data packets from the
Wireshark [2] software that was used to collect and store the
data for analysis into a form suitable for input to standard,
unmodiﬁed bioinformatics programs such as BLAST [6] and
clustalw [12]. Processing involved mapping the binary repre-
sentation of the network data onto the DNA symbol alphabet
used by bioinformatics and storing the result in FASTA [13]
formatted ﬁles.
These ﬁles were then processed into a fast, high perfor-
mance database by the NCBI formatdb [5] program. This
is not a database of the packet data in the usual terms, but
contains motif’s and signatures used by the NCBI BLAST [6]
(Basic Local Area Search Tool) suite of programs for high
speed searching by advanced heuristic algorithms, the results
of which are accompanied by statistics for validation. The
BLAST [6] programs uses a sophisticated word based search
algorithm to produce signatures from a search query that can
be applied against a preprepared database of signatures such
as that produced by formatdb [5]. The results returned by the
search are a list of entries in the database ranked in order of
score and qualiﬁed by E-value.
The default substitution matrix for nucleotide searches has
been used in the tests being discussed here in order to avoid
biasing the results. The default matrix for the software used
is an “identity matrix” which gives a bias in favor of one to
one matches between symbols. This one area where custom
software would be needed to implement the feature. At this
point in time no effort has been put into implementing or
testing the use of substitution, but it is envisaged to be a useful
extension for the future.
In bioinformatics, a qualiﬁed user (usually a domain special-
ist such as a biologist) will examine the data to make a decision
on the data quality and usability - this can be automated here
because:
1) network packet data is well characterized and not as
mutable as biological data
2) We are only interested in identiﬁcation (at this stage)
This allows a simple software routine to extract the top
few signiﬁcant matches and select the one with the highest
likelihood of being correct. This will usually, but not always
be the top of the list. For a biological search, a biologist
would examine the list and select the most likely candidate
based on domain knowledge. For the proof of concept testing
undertaken for this project, the top of the search results was
always the closest match to the query packet. This can be
expected to change when motif or partial packet searches
are tested. Further to this, it was identiﬁed that the simple
databases created for testing this method included information
such as IP numbers which may be expected to inﬂuence full
packet queries but not motif based searches.
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form of a database formatted for searching by the BLAST
[6] utility and tools that can take an unknown packet of data
and search it against the database. The tools take the form of
simple Perl scripts used to extract and format the data for a
single packet from a pcap capture ﬁle - this is then used to
search the database using the BLAST [6] program.
The database is created from a FASTA formatted [13] source
ﬁle containing each of the samples desired in the database.
The “formatdb” [5] command is used as in the example
below to create the component ﬁles for the database - in this
case “MyDatabase.nhr, MyDatabase.nin, MyDatabase.nsq”. To
create these ﬁles use the following invocation of:
formatdb -p F -i MyDatabase:fa (1)
The next command is used to search the database using the
prepared packet data in the ﬁle packet.fa, returning the top ten
matches.
blastall -v 10 -p blastn -d MyDatabase -i packet:fa (2)
The result of this process is a ﬁle containing the hits in the
database along with supporting statistics.
IV. RESULTS
Using the above commands, the contents of the ﬁle packet.fa
are used to search the prepared database. The search query
used for this demonstration is a typical lookup sent to a
DNS server. Only the ﬁrst (top) ten results (speciﬁed as a
command line argument) are used here as they will represent
the top matches between the search query and the database.
The results are returned as a plain text ﬁle with multiple parts.
The BLAST programs [6] results ﬁle is complex being
designed for the requirements of bioinformaticians, but for the
purposes of searching for wanted motif’s (terms of interest)
carried by network data packets it is ideal for testing as it
clearly shows all the components used in calculating the var-
ious statistics. In particular the section “Sequences producing
signiﬁcant alignments” lists the top ten (as asked for in this
search) results along with statistical validation. The larger the
score and the smaller the E-value the better the match and
match quality. A typical “Top Ten” list with related statistics
for each item is shown in Figure 1 and following this are
sections displaying the actual local matches for each of the
top ten results with supporting statistics, an example of which
is shown in Figure 2.
The local match sections show in detail the individual
motif’s in common between the query and each database entry.
The top line is the “FASTA comment line” which in this case
contains metadata from the Wireshark [2] capture program -
this would not normally be available in a production system
but is useful for testing. Next comes the length of the query
vector in characters. Next is the calculated Score and Expect
Values. Note that this is for the motif only, not the whole
vector. In the example shown here its calculated to be 165
bits for a motif of 83 characters long as a 100% match with
an E-value of 3e−42 which means quite a low chance of the
Fig. 1. Top ten packets matching query with supporting statistics.
Fig. 2. Motif from query and an equivalent database match.
result being a false. The following entries in Figure 1 have
a lower score and not as close a match to the query. Any
characters which do not match are shown in context in the
next section of Figure 2 though in the example given here the
match is 100%. The above information is repeated for every
motif in the query identiﬁed in the database.
V. DISCUSSION
The results obtained show that this method is a viable way
to search network data streams for strings and motifs. Having
a separate database of search terms and data types available
for comparison allows the search process to be decoupled from
the protocol stack.
However during the design and testing of this new method,
a few issues became apparent. Network data trafﬁc has some
characteristics that are not too dissimilar to biological data in
the way they cause problems for the algorithms and can be
handled in a similar fashion.
A. Duplicate Data
Typical network data trafﬁc has a large and constant super-
visory component such as arp requests (Address Resolution
Protocol [1]), heartbeat and keep-alive packets. These are
usually simple, identical or nearly packets repeated at regular
intervals which over time amount to a large number. If all
packets collected including such duplicates are stored in a
database, they create the same effect on the search process
as low complexity regions and over represented features such
as repetitive elements do on biological database searches. As
they are over-represented, any statistical ranking of results
containing such packets create distorted and biased statistics.
Any search which included one of these common, over-
represented packets or major parts thereof would return many
(thousands) of results before any nearby matches would be
529listed, undoing one of the large advantages of such a search
strategy. In biology, the standard way of handing such features
is to ﬁlter them out of the search query as in many cases
biologically relevant data may still be obtained from duplicate
data so it is usual to store every instance in the database and
only search them if required. A more practical method for
networking data is to allow only one sample of otherwise
identical packets into the database.
Another, minor problem is that certain parts of the packet
headers (such as source and destination IP numbers) are also
present in many or most entries in the database giving rise
to similar problems though with effects not as critical on the
results as over-represented full size packets. A more serious
issue is that any search will include many hundreds or more
of small matches in the results ﬁle. These small matches can
produce the equivalent of 200 pages or more of irrelevant data
using signiﬁcant resources in the process - this is a side effect
of using software not designed speciﬁcally for this purpose and
would be eliminated by using proper thresholds not available
in this software.
B. Substitution
Substitution in biological terms is the replacement of certain
amino acids with other amino acids of a similar chemical
function. The replacement occurs semi-randomly and for bi-
ological applications, it can be empirically proﬁled to derive
“substitution tables” which are a likelihood that a particular
amino acid will be replaced by another particular amino
acid. For the use of the algorithms being discussed here,
it makes sense for certain operations to use substitution. A
simple example is the substitution of a single character to
indicate “$”, “S” or “s” in the word “sex” in email Spam to
improve detection. A substitution table mapping all variations
to a single letter will enhance the Spam detection process.
While in bioinformatics substitution is usually only required
for single molecules (thus a single symbol), for the uses
being discussed here symbol and word substitutions would
be required. Rigoutsos and Huynh investigated this in 2004
with their “Chung-Kwei” Spam detection system. [9].
C. Alternative Distance Metrics
The algorithms used here are not the only ones that may
be used to calculate a distance between two or more vectors
of symbols. “Hamming distance” [14] calculations have been
used for many years in communications and can also be
used derive a distance metric. More work needs to be done
to test and tune the various algorithms involved as the test
implementation uses the standard bioinformatics algorithms
for convenience as their characteristics appear to provide a
good match to the typical network data proﬁle.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The process of creating and searching a database of network
packet information using bioinformatics principles works well
in principle. It is feasible to create a sample database con-
taining representatives of many different types of common
and uncommon packet types and content for identiﬁcation
purposes. Such a database can include examples of both good
(or acceptable) data and bad data that is used for nefarious
purposes. Detecting such bad data on a network could be
used to ﬂag their presence to an administrator or response
program for action. There is also the possibility of searching
for deﬁned phrases and terms in the data stream without
needing to process the packet through a protocol stack to get
at the data at the application layer, providing ﬂexibility and a
possible saving in resource usage. The process used here to test
and implement the described methodology is very inefﬁcient
if used for a production system but it has successfully proven
the concept is workable. This and previous work has proven
the viability of using the same type of algorithms designed
to process biological data to process network data in a packet
stream. Future work using a system based on the equivalent
of the bioinformatics alignment process used in bioinformatics
but implemented to speciﬁcally target network packet data
shows great potential.
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